We study the optimal usage-based pricing problem in a resource-constrained network with one profit-maximizing service provider and multiple groups of surplus-maximizing users. With the assumption that the service provider knows the utility function of each user (thus complete information), we find that the complete price differentiation scheme can achieve a large revenue gain (e.g., 50%) compared to no price differentiation, when the total network resource is comparably limited and the high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities. However, the complete price differentiation scheme may lead to a high implementational complexity. To trade off the revenue against the implementational complexity, we further study the partial price differentiation scheme and design a polynomial-time algorithm that can compute the optimal partial differentiation prices. We also consider the incomplete information case where the service provider does not know to which group each user belongs. We show that it is still possible to realize price differentiation under this scenario and provide the sufficient and necessary condition under which an incentive-compatible differentiation scheme can achieve the same revenue as under complete information.
and are used to coordinate different network entities to achieve the maximum system performance in a distributed fashion. The other is the "economics-based" pricing, which is used by a network service provider to various objectives including revenue maximization. The proper design of such a pricing becomes particularly challenging today due to the exponential growth of data volume and applications in both wireline and wireless networks. In this paper, we focus on studying the "economics-based" pricing schemes for managing communication networks.
Economists have proposed many sophisticated pricing mechanisms to extract surpluses from the consumers and maximize revenue (or profits) for the providers. A typical example is the optimal nonlinear pricing [7] [8] [9] . In practice, however, we often observe simple pricing schemes deployed by the service providers. Typical examples include flat-fee pricing and (piecewise) linear usage-based pricing. One potential reason behind the gap between "theory" and "practice" is that the optimal pricing schemes derived in economics often has a high implementational complexity. Besides a higher maintenance cost, complex pricing schemes are not "customer-friendly" and discourage customers from using the services [10] , [11] . Furthermore, achieving the highest possible revenue often with complicated pricing schemes requires knowing the information (identity and preference) of each customer, which can be challenging in large scale communication networks. It is then natural to ask the following two questions.
1) How to design simple pricing schemes to achieve the best tradeoff between complexity and performance? 2) How does the network information structure impact the design of pricing schemes? This paper tries to answer the above two questions with some stylized communication network models. Different from some previous work that considered a flat-fee pricing scheme where the payment does not depend on the resource consumption (e.g., [10] , [12] , and [13] ), here we study the revenue maximization problem with the linear usage-based pricing schemes, where a user's total payment is linearly proportional to allocated resource. In wireless communication networks, however, the usage-based pricing scheme seems to become increasingly popular due to the rapid growth of wireless data traffic. In June 2010, AT&T in the US switched from the flat-fee-based pricing (i.e., unlimited data for a fixed fee) to the usage-based pricing schemes for 3G wireless data [14] . Verizon followed up with similar plans in July 2011. Similar usage-based pricing plans have been adopted by major Chinese wireless service providers including China Mobile and China UniCom. Thus, the research on the usage-based pricing is of great practical importance.
In this paper, we consider the revenue maximization problem of a monopolist service provider facing multiple groups of users. Each user determines its optimal resource demand to maximize the surplus, which is the difference between its utility and payment. The service provider chooses the pricing schemes to maximize his revenue, subject to a limited resource. We consider both complete information and incomplete information scenarios and design different pricing schemes with different implementational complexity levels.
Our main contributions are as follows.
• Complete network information: We propose a polynomial algorithm to compute the optimal solution of the partial price differentiation problem, which includes the complete price differentiation scheme and the single pricing scheme as special cases. The optimal solution has a threshold structure, which allocates positive resources to high-willingness-to-pay users with priorities. • Revenue gain under the complete network information:
Compared to the single pricing scheme, we identify the two important factors behind the revenue increase of the (complete and partial) price differentiation schemes: the differentiation gain and the effective market size. The revenue gain is the most significant when high users are minority among the whole population and total resource is limited but not too small. • Incomplete network information: We design an incentivecompatible scheme with the goal to achieve the same maximum revenue that can be achieved with the complete information. We find that if the differences of willingness to pay of users are larger than some thresholds, this incentive-compatible scheme can achieve the same maximum revenue. We further characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for the thresholds. It is interesting to compare our results under the complete network information scenario with results in [10] and [15] . In [10] , the authors showed that the revenue gain of price differentiation is small with a flat-entry-fee-based Paris Metro Pricing (e.g., [16] ), and a complicated differentiation strategy may not be worthwhile. Chau et al. [15] further derived the sufficient conditions of congestion functions that guarantee the viability of these Paris Metro Pricing schemes. By contrast, our results show that the revenue gain of price differentiation can be substantial for a usage-based pricing system. Some recent work of usage-based pricing and revenue management in communication network includes [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Basar and Srikant in [17] investigated the bandwidth allocation problem in a single-link network with the single pricing scheme. Shen and Basar in [18] extended the study to a more general nonlinear pricing case with the incomplete network information scenario. They discussed the single pricing scheme under incomplete information with a continuum distribution of users' types. In contrast, our study on the incomplete information focuses on the linear pricing with a discrete setting of users' types. We also show that, besides the single pricing scheme, it is also possible to design differentiation pricing schemes under incomplete information. Daoud et al. [19] studied an uplink power allocation problem in a CDMA system, where the interference among users is the key constraint instead of the limited total resource considered in our paper. Jiang et al. in [20] and Hande et al. in [21] focused on the study of the time-dependent pricing. He and Walrand in [22] , Shakkottai and Srikant in [23] , and Gajic et al. in [24] focused on the interaction between different service providers embodied in the pricing strategies, rather than the design of the pricing mechanism. Moreover, none of the related work considered the partial differential pricing as in our paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a network with a total amount of limited resource (which can be in the form of rate, bandwidth, power, time slot, etc.). The resource is allocated by a monopolistic service provider to a set of user groups. Each group has homogeneous users 1 with the same utility function (1) where is the allocated resource to one user in group and represents the willingness to pay of group . The logarithmic utility function is commonly used to model the proportionally fair resource allocation in communication networks (see [17] for detailed explanations). The analysis of the complete information case can also be extended to more general utility functions (see our online technical report [25] ). Without loss of generality, we assume that . In other words, group 1 contains users with the highest valuation, and group contains users with the lowest valuation.
We consider two types of information structures. 1) Complete information: The service provider knows each user's utility function. Though the complete information is a very strong assumption, it is the most frequently studied scenario in the network pricing literature [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . The significance of studying the complete information is twofold. It serves as the benchmark of practical designs and provides important insights for the incomplete information analysis. 2) Incomplete information: The service provider knows the total number of groups , the number of users in each group , and the utility function of each group . It does not know which user belongs to which group. Such assumption in our discrete setting is analogous to that the service provider knows only the users' types distribution in a continuum case. Such statistical information can be obtained through long-term observations of a stationary user population. The interaction between the service provider and users can be characterized as a two-stage Stackelberg model shown in Fig. 1 . The service provider publishes the pricing scheme in Stage 1, and users respond with their demands in Stage 2. The users want to maximize their surpluses by optimizing their demands according to the pricing scheme. The service provider wants to maximize its revenue by setting the right pricing scheme to induce desirable demands from users. Since the service provider has a limited total resource, it must guarantee that the total demand from users is no larger than what it can supply.
The details of pricing schemes depend on the information structure of the service provider. Under complete information, since the service provider can distinguish different groups of users, it announces the pricing and the admission control decisions to different groups of users. It can choose from the com- plete price differentiation scheme, the single pricing scheme, and the partial price differentiation scheme to realize a desired tradeoff between the implementational complexity and the total revenue. Under incomplete information, it publishes a common price menu to all users and allows users to freely choose a particular price option in this menu. All these pricing schemes will be discussed one by one in the following sections.
Note that it is possible for a user to achieve an "arbitrage" by splitting into several smaller users, each of which requests a small amount of resource and enjoys a lower unit price. Fortunately, preventing arbitrage of services is often easier and less costly than that of goods [28] . For example, we can often uniquely identify a user through its MAC address. Full discussion of arbitrage prevention, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
III. COMPLETE PRICE DIFFERENTIATION UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
We first consider the complete information case. Since the service provider knows the utility and the identity of each user, it is possible to maximize the revenue by charging a different price to each group of users. The analysis will be based on backward induction, starting from Stage 2 and then moving to Stage 1.
A. User's Surplus Maximization Problem in Stage 2
If a user in group has been admitted into the network and offered a linear price in Stage 1, then it solves the following surplus maximization problem:
(2) which leads to the following unique optimal demand: where
(3)
Remark 1: The analysis of the Stage 2 user surplus maximization problem is the same for all pricing schemes. The result in (3) will be also used in Sections IV-VI.
B. Service Provider's Pricing and Admission Control Problem in Stage 1
In Stage 1, the service provider maximizes its revenue by choosing the price and the number of admitted users for each group subject to the limited total resource . The key idea is to perform a Complete Price differentiation scheme, i.e., charging each group with a different price (4) subject to (5) 
where , , and . We use bold symbols to denote vectors in the sequel. Constraint (5) is the solution of the Stage 2 user surplus maximization problem in (3) . Constraint (6) denotes the admission control decision, and constraint (7) represents the total limited resource in the network.
The problem is not straightforward to solve since it is a nonconvex optimization problem with a nonconvex objective function (summation of products of and ), a coupled constraint (7) , and integer variables . However, it is possible to convert it into an equivalent convex formulation through a series of transformations, and thus the problem can be solved efficiently.
First, we can remove the sign in constraint (5) by realizing the fact that there is no need to set higher than for users in group ; users in group already demand zero resource and generate zero revenue when . This means that we can rewrite constraint (5) as and (8) Plugging (8) into (4), then the objective function becomes . We can further decompose the problem in the following two subproblems. 1) Resource allocation: For a fixed admission control decision , solve for the optimal resource allocation subject to (9) Denote the solution of as . We further maximize the revenue of the integer admission control variables . 2) Admission control: subject to (10) Let us first solve the subproblem in . Note that it is a convex optimization problem. By using Lagrange multiplier technique, we can get the first-order necessary and sufficient condition: (11) where is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the resource constraint (9) . Meanwhile, we note the resource constraint (9) must hold with equality since the objective is strictly increasing function in . Thus, by plugging (11) into (9), we have (12) This weighted water-filling problem (where can be viewed as the water level) in general has no closed-form solution for . However, we can efficiently determine the optimal solution by exploiting the special structure of our problem. Note that since , then must satisfy the following condition: (13) for a group index threshold value satisfying and (14) In other words, only groups with index no larger than will be allocated the positive resource. This property leads to the following simple Algorithm 1 to compute and group index threshold : We start by assuming and compute . If (14) is not satisfied, we decrease by one and recompute until (14) is satisfied. 
Since
, Algorithm 1 always converges and returns the unique values of and . The complexity is , i.e., linear in the number of user groups (not the number of users).
With and , the solution of the resource allocation problem can be written as otherwise (15) For the ease of discussions, we introduce a new notion of the effective market, which denotes all the groups allocated nonzero resource. For the resource allocation subproblem , the threshold describes the size of the effective market. All groups with indices no larger than are effective groups, Fig. 2 . Six-group example for the effective market: The willingness to pay decreases from group 1 to group 6. The effective market threshold can be obtained by Algorithm 1 and is 4 in this example.
and users in these groups as effective users. An example of the effective market is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Now let us solve the admission control subproblem . Denote the objective (10) as , by (15), then . We first relax the integer domain constraint of as . Since (13), by taking the derivative of the objective function with respect to , we have (16) Also from (13), we have , thus , for , and , for
. This means that the objective is strictly increasing in for all , thus it is optimal to admit all users in the effective market. The admission decisions for groups not in the effective market are irrelevant to the optimization since those users consume zero resource. Therefore, one of the optimal solutions of the subproblem is for all . Solving the and the subproblems leads to the optimal solution of the problem. Theorem 1: There exists an optimal solution of the problem that satisfies the following conditions.
• All users are admitted: for all • There exist a value and a group index threshold , such that only the top groups of users receive positive resource allocations otherwise with the prices otherwise.
The values of and can be computed as in Algorithm 1 by setting , for all . Theorem 1 provides the right economic intuition: The service provider maximizes its revenue by charging a higher price to users with a higher willingness to pay. It is easy to check that for any . The low-willingness-to-pay users are excluded from the markets.
C. Properties
Here, we summarize some interesting properties of the optimal complete price differentiation scheme.
1) Threshold Structure: The threshold-based resource allocation means that higher-willingness-to-pay groups have higher priories of obtaining the resource at the optimal solution.
To see this clearly, assume the effective market size is under parameters and . Here, the superscript denotes the first parameter set. Now consider another set of parameters and , where for each group and the new The effective market size is . By (13), we can see that . Furthermore, we can show that if some high-willingness-to-pay group has many more users under the latter system parameters, i.e., is much larger than for some , then the effective size will be strictly decreased, i.e.,
. In other words, the increase of high-willingness-to-pay users will drive the low-willingness-to-pay users out of the effective market.
2) Admission Control With Pricing: Theorem 1 shows the explicit admission control is not necessary at the optimal solution. Also from Theorem 1, we can see that when the number of users in any effective group increases, the price , for all , increases and resource , for all , decreases. The prices serve as the indications of the scarcity of the resources and will automatically prevent the low-willingness-to-pay users to consume the network resource.
IV. SINGLE PRICING SCHEME
In Section III, we showed that the scheme is the optimal pricing scheme to maximize the revenue under complete information. However, such a complicated pricing scheme is of high implementational complexity. In this section, we study the single pricing scheme. It is clear that the scheme will in general suffer a revenue loss compared to the scheme. We will try to characterize the impact of various system parameters on such revenue loss.
A. Problem Formulation and Solution
Let us first formulate the Single Pricing problem subject to
Compared to the problem in Section III, here the service provider charges a single price to all groups of users. After a similar transformation as in Section III, we can show that the optimal single price satisfies the following the weighted waterfilling condition Thus, we can obtain the following solution that shares a similar structure as complete price differentiation.
Theorem 2: There exists an optimal solution of the problem that satisfies the following conditions.
• All users are admitted: for all 
B. Properties
The scheme shares several similar properties as the scheme Section III-C, including the threshold structure and admission control with pricing. Similarly, we can define the effective market for the scheme. It is more interesting to notice the differences between these two schemes. To distinguish solutions, we use the superscript "cp" for the scheme, and "sp" for the scheme. Proposition 1: Under same parameters and , the following holds.
1) The effective market of the scheme is no larger than the one of the scheme, i.e., . 2) There exists a threshold , such that: • groups with indices less than (high-willingness-to-pay users) are charged with higher prices and allocated less resources in the scheme, i.e., and ,
, where the equality holds if only if and ; • groups with indices greater than (low-willingness-to-pay users) are charged with lower prices and allocated more resources in the scheme, i.e., and , . Here, is the optimal single price. The proof is given in the online technical report [25] . An illustrative example is shown in Figs. 3 and 4 .
It is easy to understand that the scheme makes less revenue since it is a feasible solution to the problem. A little bit more computation sheds more light on this comparison. We introduce the following notations to streamline the comparison: • : the average willingness to pay per an effective user. Based on Theorem 1 , the revenue of the scheme is (17) where (18) Based on Theorem 2 , the revenue of the scheme is (19) From (17) and (19) , it is clear to see that due to two factors: one is the nonnegative term in (18) , the other is . Ahigher level of differentiation implies a no smaller effective market. Let us further discuss them in the following two cases.
• If , then the additional term of (18) in (17) (18) as price differentiation gain, as it measures the average price difference between any effective users in the scheme. The larger the price difference, the larger the gain. When there is no differentiation in the degenerating case , the gain is zero. • If , since the common part of two revenue is a strictly increasing function of , price differentiation makes more revenue even if the positive differentiation gain is not taken into consideration. This result is intuitive: More consumers with purchasing power always mean more revenue in the service provider's pocket. Finally, we note that the scheme in Section III requires the complete network information. The scheme here, on the other hand, works in the incomplete information case as well. This distinction becomes important in Section VI.
V. PARTIAL PRICE DIFFERENTIATION UNDER COMPLETE INFORMATION
For a service provider facing thousands of user types, it is often impractical to design a price choice for each user type. The reasons behind this, as discussed in [11] , are mainly high system overheads and customers' aversion. However, as we have shown in Section IV, the single pricing scheme may suffer a considerable revenue loss. How can we achieve a good tradeoff between the implementational complexity and the total revenue? In reality, we usually see that the service provider offers only a few pricing plans for the entire users population; we term it as the partial price differentiation scheme. In this section, we will answer the following question: If the service provider is constrained to maintain a limited number of prices,
, , then what is the optimal pricing strategy and the maximum revenue? Concretely, the Partial Price differentiation problem is formulated as follows:
subject to (20)
Here, denotes the set . Since we consider the complete information scenario in this section, the service provider can choose the price charged to each group, thus constraints (20)- (22) are the same as in the problem. Constraints (23) and (24) mean that charged to each group is one of choices from the set . For convenience, we define cluster , which is a set of groups charged with the same price . We use superscript to denote clusters, and subscript to denote groups through this section. We term the binary variables as the partition, which determines to which cluster each group belongs. The problem is a combinatorial optimization problem and is more difficult than the previous and problems. On the other hand, we notice that the problem formulation includes the scheme and the scheme scenario as special cases. The insights we obtained from solving these two special cases in Sections III and IV will be helpful to solve the general problem.
A. Three-Level Decomposition
To solve the problem, we decompose and tackle it in three levels. In the lowest Level 3, we determine the pricing and resource allocation for each cluster, given a fixed partition and fixed resource allocation among clusters. In Level 2, we compute the optimal resource allocation among clusters, given a fixed partition. In Level 1, we optimize the partition among groups.
1) Level-3: Pricing and Resource Allocation in Each Cluster: For a fixed partition and a cluster resource allocation , we focus the pricing and resource allocation problems within each cluster ,
Level 3 subject to
The Level-3 subproblem coincides with the scheme discussed in Section IV since all groups within the same cluster are charged with a single price . We can then directly apply the results in Theorem 2 to solve the Level-3 problem. We denote the effective market threshold 2 for cluster as , which can be computed in Algorithm 2. An illustrative example is shown in Fig. 5 , where the cluster contains four groups (group 4, 5, 6, and 7), and the effective market contains groups 4 and 5, thus 2 Note that we do not assume that the effective market threshold equals to the number of effective groups, e.g., there are two effective groups in Fig. 5 , but threshold . Later, we will prove that there is a unified threshold for the problem. Then, by this result, the group index threshold actually coincides with the number of effective groups.
. The service provider obtains the following maximum revenue obtained from cluster :
2) Level-2: Resource Allocation Among Clusters: For a fixed partition , we then consider the resource allocation among clusters Level 2 subject to
We will show in Section V-B that subproblems in Levels 2 and 3 can be transformed into a complete price differentiation problem under proper technique conditions. Let us denote the its optimal value as . 3) Level-1: Cluster Partition: Finally, we solve the cluster partition problem
Level 1 subject to
This partition problem is a combinatorial optimization problem. The size of its feasible set is , Stirling number of the second kind [27, Ch.13] , where is the binomial coefficient. Some numerical examples are given in the third row in Table I . If the number of prices is given, the feasible set size is exponential in the total number of groups . For our problem, however, it is possible to reduce the size of the feasible set by exploiting the special problem structure. More specifically, the group indices in each cluster should be consecutive at the optimum. This means that the size of the feasible set is as shown in the last row in Table I , and thus is much smaller than . Next, we discuss how to solve the three level subproblems. A route map for the whole solving process is given in Fig. 6 .
B. Solving Levels 2 and 3
The optimal solution (25) of the Level-3 problem can be equivalently written as (26) where (27) Fig. 6 . Decomposition and simplification of the general problem: The three-level decomposition structure of the problem is shown in the left-hand side. After simplifications in Sections V-B and V-C, the problem will be reduced to structure in right-hand side. The equality (a) in (26) means that each cluster can be equivalently treated as a group with homogeneous users with the same willingness to pay . We name this equivalent group as a super-group (SG). We summarize the above result as the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For every cluster and total resource , , we can find an equivalent super-group that satisfies conditions in (27) and achieves the same revenue under the scheme. Based on Lemma 1, the Level-2 and Level-3 subproblems together can be viewed as the problem for super-groups. Since a cluster and its super-group form a one-to-one mapping, we will use the two words interchangeably in the sequel.
However, simply combining Theorems 1 and 2 to solve the Level-2 and Level-3 subproblems for a fixed partition can result in a very high complexity. This is because the effective markets within each super-group and between super-groups are coupled together. An illustrative example of this coupling effective market is shown in Fig. 7 , where is the threshold between clusters and has three possible positions (i.e., between groups 2 and 3, between groups 5 and 6, or after group 6); and and are thresholds within cluster and , which have two or three possible positions, respectively. Thus, there are possible thresholds possibilities in total.
The key idea to resolve this coupling issue is to show that the situation in Fig. 7 cannot be an optimal solution of the problem. The results in Sections III and IV show that there is a unified threshold at the optimum in both the and cases, e.g., Fig. 2 . Next, we will show that a unified single threshold also exists in the case. Lemma 2: At any optimal solution of the scheme, the group indices of the effective market are consecutive.
The proof of Lemma 2 can be found in our online technical report [25] . The intuition is that the resource should be always allocated to high-willingness-to-pay users at the optimum. Thus, it is not possible to have Fig. 7 at an optimal solution, where high-willingness-to-pay users in group 2 are allocated zero resource, while low-willingness-to-pay users in group 3 are allocated positive resources.
Based on Lemma 2, we know that there is a unified effective market threshold for the problem, denoted as . Since all groups with indices larger than make zero contribution to the revenue, we can ignore them and only consider the partition problem for the first groups. Given a partition that divides the groups into clusters (super-groups), we can apply the result in Section III to compute the optimal revenue in Level-2 based on Theorem 1 (28)
C. Solving Level-1 1) With a Given Effective Market Threshold
: Based on the previous results, we first simplify the Level-1 subproblem and prove the theorem below.
Theorem 3: For a given threshold , the optimal partition of the Level-1 subproblem is the solution of the following optimization problem.
Level 1 subject to (29) where , is the value of average willingness to pay of the th group for the partition , and Proof: The objective function and the first three constraints in Level 1 are easy to understand: if the effective market threshold is given, then the objective function of the Level-1 subproblem, maximizing in (28) over , is as simple as minimizing as the Level-1 problem suggested; the first three constraints are given by the definition of the partition.
Constraint (29) is the threshold condition that supports (28) , which means that the least-willingness-to-pay users in the effective market have a positive demand. It ensures that calculating the revenue by (28) is valid. Remember that the solution of the problem of Levels 2 and 3 is threshold-based, and Lemma 2 indicates that (29) is sufficient for that all groups with willingness larger than group can have positive demands.
Otherwise, we can construct another partition leading to a larger revenue (please refer to the proof of Lemma 2), or equivalently leading to a less objective value of Level 1 . This leads to a contradiction. The Level-1 problem is still a combinatorial optimization problem with a large feasible set of (similar as the original Level 1). The following result can help us to reduce the size of the feasible set.
Theorem 4: For any effective market size and number of prices , an optimal partition of the problem involves consecutive group indices within clusters.
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in our online technical report [25] . We first prove this result is true for Level 1 without constraint (29) , and further show that this result will not affected by (29) . The intuition is that high-willingness-to-pay users should be allocated positive resources with priority. It implies that groups with similar willingness to pay should be partitioned in the same cluster, instead of in several faraway clusters. Or equivalently, the group indices within each cluster should be consecutive.
We define as the set of all partitions with consecutive group indices within each cluster, and is the value of objective of Level 1 for a partition . Algorithm 3 finds the optimal solution of Level 1 . The main idea for this algorithm is to enumerate every possible partition in set , and then check whether the threshold condition (29) can be satisfied. The main part of this algorithm is to enumerate all partitions in set of feasible partitions. Thus, the complexity of Algorithm 3 is no more than . 
2) Search the Optimal Effective Market Threshold
: We know the optimal market threshold is upper-bounded, i.e., . Thus, we can first run Algorithm 1 to calculate the effective market size for the scheme . Then, we search the optimal iteratively using Algorithm 3 as an inner loop. We start by letting and run Algorithm 3. If there is no solution, we decrease by one and run Algorithm 3 again. The algorithm will terminate once we find an effective market threshold where Algorithm 3 has an optimal solution. Once the optimal threshold and the partition of the clusters are determined, we can further run Algorithm 1 to solve the joint optimal resource allocation and pricing scheme. The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 4 as follows. In Algorithm 4, it invokes two functions: as described in Algorithm 1 and Level-1 as in Algorithm 3.
returns a vector with two elements: denotes the first element , and denotes the second element in the problem.
The above analysis leads to the following theorem. Theorem 5: The solution obtained by Algorithm 4 is optimal for the problem. Proof: It is clear that Algorithm 4 enumerates every possible value of the effective market size for the problem , and for a given , its inner loop Algorithm 3 enumerates every possible partition in set . Therefore, the result in Theorem 4 follows.
Next, we discuss the complexity of Algorithm 4. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is , and we run it twice in Algorithm 4. The worst-case complexity of Algorithm 3 is , and we run it no more than times. Thus, the whole complexity of Algorithm 4 is no more than , which is polynomial of .
VI. PRICE DIFFERENTIATION UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In Sections III-V, we discuss various pricing schemes with different implementational complexity level under complete information, the revenues of which can be viewed as the benchmark of practical pricing designs. In this section, we further study the incomplete information scenario, where the service provider does not know the group association of each user. The challenge for pricing in this case is that the service provider needs to provide the right incentive so that a group user does not want to pretend to be a user in a different group. It is clear that the scheme in Section III and the scheme in Section V cannot be directly applied here. The scheme in Section IV is a special case since it does not require the user-group association information in the first place and thus can be applied in the incomplete information scenario directly. On the other hand, we know that the scheme may suffer a considerable revenue loss compared to the scheme. Thus, it is natural to ask whether it is possible to design an incentive-compatible differentiation scheme under incomplete Fig. 8 . Four-group example of the scheme: where the prices are the same as the scheme. To mimic the same resource allocation as under the scheme, one necessary (but not sufficient) condition is for all , where is the optimal resource allocation of the scheme.
information. In this section, we design a quantity-based price menu to incentivize users to make the right self-selection and to achieve the same maximum revenue of the scheme under complete information with proper technical conditions. We name it as the Incentive-Compatible Complete Price differentiation scheme. In the scheme, the service provider publishes a quantity-based price menu, which consists of several step functions of resource quantities. Users are allowed to freely choose their quantities. The aim of this price menu is to make the users selfdifferentiated, so as to mimic the same result (the same prices and resource allocations) of the scheme under complete information. Based on Theorem 1, there are only (without confusion, we remove the superscript "cp" to simplify the notation) effective groups of users receiving nonzero resource allocations, thus there are steps of unit prices, in the price menu. These prices are exactly the same optimal prices that the service provider would charge for effective groups as in Theorem 1. Note that for the groups, all the prices in the menu are too high for them, then they will still demand zero resource. The quantity is divided into intervals by thresholds, . The scheme can specified as follows: when when . . .
when (30)
A four-group example is shown in Fig. 8 . Note that in contrast to the usual "volume discount," here the price is nondecreasing in quantity. This is motivated by the resource allocation in Theorem 1, where a user with a higher is charged a higher price for a larger resource allocation. Thus, the observable quantity can be viewed as an indication of the unobservable users' willingness to pay and help to realize price differentiation under incomplete information.
The key challenge in the scheme is to properly set the quantity thresholds so that users are perfectly segmented through self-differentiation. This is, however, not always possible. Next, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee the perfect segmentation.
Let us first study the self-selection problem between two groups: group and group with . Later on, Fig. 9 . When the threshold , the group user cannot obtain if it chooses the lower price at a quantity less than . Therefore, it will automatically choose the high price to maximize its surplus.
we will generalize the results to multiple groups. Here, group has a higher willingness to pay and will be charged with a higher price in the case. The incentive-compatible constraint is that a high-willingness-to-pay user cannot get more surplus by pretending to be a low-willingness-to-pay user, i.e., , where is the surplus of a group user when it is charged with price .
Without confusion, we still use to denote the optimal resource allocation under the optimal prices in Theorem 1, i.e.,
. We define as the quantity satisfying (31)
In other words, when a group user is charged with a lower price and demands resource quantity , it achieves the same as the maximum surplus under the optimal price of the scheme , as showed in Fig. 9 . Since the there two solutions of the first equation of (31), we constraint to be the one that is smaller than .
To maintain the group users' incentive to choose the higher price instead of , we must have , which means a group user cannot obtain if it chooses a quantity less than . In other words, it will automatically choose the higher (and the desirable) price to maximize its surplus. On the other hand, we must have in order to maintain the optimal resource allocation and allow a group user to choose the right quantity-price combination (illustrated in Fig. 8) .
Therefore, it is clear that the necessary and sufficient condition that the scheme under incomplete information achieves the same maximum revenue of the scheme under complete information is (32) By solving these inequalities, we can obtain the following theorem (detailed proof in our online technical report [25] ).
Theorem 6: There exist unique thresholds , such that the scheme achieves the same maximum revenue as in the complete information case if for Moreover, is the unique solution of the equation over the domain . We want to mention that the condition in Theorem 6 is necessary and sufficient for the case of effective groups. 3 For , Theorem 6 is sufficient but not necessary. The intuition of Theorem 6 is that users need to be sufficiently different to achieve the maximum revenue.
The following result immediately follows Theorem 6. Corollary 1: The 's in Theorem 6 satisfy for , where is the larger root of equation . Corollary 1 means that the users do not need to be extremely different to achieve the maximum revenue.
When the conditions in Theorem 6 are not satisfied, there may be revenue loss by using the pricing menu in (30). Since it is difficult to explicitly solve the parameterized transcend (31), we are not able to characterize the loss in a closed form yet.
A. Extensions to Partial Price Differentiation Under Incomplete Information
For any given system parameters, we can numerically check whether a partial price differentiation scheme can achieve the same maximum revenue under both the complete and incomplete information scenarios. The idea is similar as we described in this section. Since the problem can be viewed as the problem for all effective super-groups, then we can check the bound in Theorem 6 for super-groups (once the super-group partition is determined by the searching using Algorithm 4). Deriving an analytical sufficient condition (as in Theorem 6) for an incentive-compatible partial price differentiation scheme, however, is highly nontrivial and is part of our future study.
VII. CONNECTIONS WITH THE CLASSICAL PRICE DIFFERENTIATION TAXONOMY
In economics, price differentiation is often categorized by the first/second/third-degree price differentiation taxonomy [28] . This taxonomy is often used in the context of unlimited resources and general pricing functions. The proposed schemes in our paper have several key differences from these standard concepts, mainly due to the assumption of limited total resources and the choice of linear usage-based pricing.
In the first-degree price differentiation, each user is charged a price based on its willingness to pay. Such a scheme is also called the perfect price differentiation, as it captures users' entire surpluses (i.e., leaving users with zero payoffs). For the complete price differentiation scheme under complete information in Section III, the service provider does not extract all surpluses from users, mainly due to the choice of linear price functions. All effective users obtain positive payoffs. 3 There might be other groups who are not allocated positive resource under the optimal pricing.
In the second-degree price differentiation, prices are set according to quantities sold (e.g., the volume discount). The pricing scheme under incomplete information in Section VI has a similar flavor of quantity-based charging. However, our proposed pricing scheme charges a higher unit price for a larger quantity purchase, which is opposite to the usual practice of volume discount. This is due to our motivation of mimicking the optimal pricing differentiation scheme under the complete information. Our focus is to characterize the sufficient conditions, under which the revenue loss due to incomplete information (also called "information rent" [7] [8] [9] , [29] ) is zero.
In the third-degree price differentiation, prices are set according to some customer segmentation. The segmentation is usually made based on users' certain attributes such as ages, occupations, and genders. The partial price differentiation scheme in Section V is analogous to the third-degree price differentiation, but here the user segmentation is still based on users' willingness to pay. The motivation of our scheme is to reduce the implementational complexity.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We provide numerical examples to quantitatively study several key properties of price differentiation strategies in this section.
A. When Is Price Differentiation Most Beneficial?
Definition 1 (Revenue Gain): We define the revenue gain of one pricing scheme as the ratio of the revenue difference (between this pricing scheme and the single pricing scheme) normalized by the revenue of single pricing scheme.
In this section, we will study the revenue gain of the scheme, i.e., , where denotes the number of users in each groups, denotes their willingness to pay, and is the total resource. Notice that this gain is the maximum possible differentiation gain among all schemes. We first study a simple two-group case. According to Theorems 1 and 2, the revenue under the scheme and the scheme can be calculated as follows:
where . The revenue gain will depend on five parameters, , , , , and . To simplify notations, let be the total number of the users, the percentage of group-1 users, and the level of normalized available resource. Thus, the revenue gain can be expressed as (33) Fig. 10 . One example of the revenue gain for the scheme. It is clear that the revenue gain can be divided into three regions. Region (1), increasing region, where , and the revenue gain comes from the differentiation gain. Region (2) , decreasing region, where , , and the revenue gain comes from larger effective market and differentiation gain. Region (3), zero region, where , and is a degenerating case where two pricing scheme coincide.
Next, we discuss the impact of each parameter.
Observation 1: In terms of the parameter , monotonically increases in and decrease in .
The maximum is obtained at , when the resource allocated to the group-2 user just becomes zero in the scheme. One example is shown in Fig. 10 . It is clear that the revenue gain is not monotonic in the willingness-to-pay ratio. Its behavior can be divided into three regions: the increasing Region (1) with , the decreasing Region (2) with , and the zero Region (3) with . It is also interesting to note that three regions are closely related to the effective market sizes:
in Region (1); in Region (2); and in Region (3) where the scheme degenerates to the scheme. The peak point of the revenue gain correspond to the place where the effective market of the scheme changes. Intuitively, the scheme increases the revenue by charging the high willingness groups with high prices, thus the revenue gain increases first when the difference of willingness to pay increases. However, when the difference of willingness to pay is very large, the scheme obtains most revenue from the high-willingness-to-pay users, while the scheme declines the low-willingness-to-pay users but serves the high-willingness-to-pays only. Both schemes lead to similar resource allocation in this region, and thus the revenue gain decreases as the difference of willingness-to-pays increases. Fig. 10 shows the revenue gain under usage-based pricing can be very high in some scenario, e.g., over 50% in this example. We can define this peak revenue gain as When is small, which means high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities in the effective market, the advantage of price differentiation is very evident. As shown in Fig. 11, when , the maximum possible revenue gain can be over than 20%; when , this gain can be even higher than 50%. However, when high-willingness-to-pay users are majority, the price differentiation gain is very limited; for example, the gain is no larger than 8% and 2% for and 0.9, respectively. Intuitively, high-willingness-to-pay users are the most profitable users in the market. Ignoring them is detrimental in terms of revenue even if they only occupy a small fraction of the population. Since the scheme is set based on the average willingness to pay of the effective market, the high-willingness-to-pay users will be ignored (in the sense of not charging the desirable high price) when is small. In contrast, ignoring the low-willingness-to-pay users when is large is not a big issue.
Observation 3: For parameter , is not a monotonic function in . Its shape looks like a skewed bell. The gain is either small when is very small or very large.
Small means that resource is very limited, and both schemes allocate the resource to high-willingness-to-pay users (see the discussion of the threshold structure in Sections III and IV), and thus there is not much difference between two pricing schemes. While is very large, i.e., the resource is abundant, the prices and the resource allocation with or without differentiation become similar (which can be easily checked from formulations in Theorems 1 and 2). In these two scenarios, similar resource allocations lead to similar revenues. These explain the bell shape for parameter .
We find that the revenue gain can be very high under two conditions based on the above observations. First, the high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities in the effective market. Second, the total resource is comparatively limited.
For cases with three or more groups, the analytical study becomes much more challenging due to many more parameters. Moreover, the complex threshold structure of the effective market makes the problem even complicated. We will present some numerical studies to illustrate some interesting insights.
For illustration convenience, we choose a three-group example and three different sets of parameters as shown in Table II . To limit the dimension of the problem, we set the parameters such that the total number of users and the average willingness to pay (i.e., ) of all users are the same across three different parameter settings. This ensures that the scheme achieves the same revenue in three different cases when resource is abundant. Fig. 12 illustrates how the differentiation gain changing changes in resource .
Similar as the analytical study of the two-group case, Fig. 12 shows that the revenue gain is large only when the high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities (e.g., case 1) in the effective market and the resource is limited but not too small ( in all three cases). When resource is large enough (e.g., ), the gain will gradually diminish to zero as the resource increases. For each curve in Fig. 12 , there are two peak points. Each peak point represents a change of the effective market threshold in the scheme, i.e., when the resource allocation to a group becomes zero. In numerical studies of networks with groups (not shown in this paper), we have observed the similar conditions for achieving a large differentiation gain and the phenomenon of peak points.
B. What Is the Best Tradeoff of Partial Price Differentiation?
In Section V, we design Algorithm 4 that optimally solves the problem with a polynomial complexity. Here, we study the tradeoff between total revenue and implementational complexity.
To illustrate the tradeoff, we consider a five-group example with parameters shown in Table III . Note that high-willingness-to-pay users are minorities here. Fig. 13 shows the revenue gain as a function of total resource under different schemes (including scheme as a special case), and Fig. 14  shows how the effective market thresholds change with the total resource.
We enlarge Figs. 13 and 14 within the range of , which is the most complex and interesting part due to several peak points. Similar to Fig. 12 , we observe peak points for each curve in Fig. 13 . Each peak point again represents a change of effective market threshold of the single pricing scheme, as we can easily verify by comparing Fig. 14 to Fig. 13 . Fig. 13 . Revenue gain of a five-group example under different price differentiation schemes. 
TABLE III PARAMETER SETTING OF A FIVE-GROUP EXAMPLE
As the resource increases from 0, all gains in Fig. 13 first overlap with each other, then the two-price scheme (blue curve) separates from the others at , after that the three-price scheme (purple curve) separates at , and finally the four-price scheme (dark yellow curve) separates at near . These phenomena are due to the threshold structure of the scheme. When the resource is very limited, the effective markets under all pricing schemes include only one group with the highest willingness to pay, and all pricing schemes coincide with the scheme. As the resource increases, the effective market enlarges from two groups to finally five groups. The change of the effective market threshold can be directly observed in Fig. 14. Comparing across different curves in Fig. 14, we find that the effective market size is nondecreasing with the number of prices for the same resource . This agrees with our intuition in Section IV-B, which states that the size of effective market indicates the degree of differentiation. Fig. 13 provides the service provider a global picture of choosing the most proper pricing scheme according to achieve the desirable financial target under a certain parameter setting. For example, if the total resource , the two-price scheme seems to be a sweet spot, as it achieves a differential gain of 14.8% compared to the scheme and is only 2.4% worse than the scheme with five prices.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the revenue-maximizing problem for a monopoly service provider under both complete and incomplete network information. Under complete information, our focus is to investigate the tradeoff between the total revenue and the implementational complexity (measured in the number of pricing choices available for users). Among the three pricing differentiation schemes we proposed (i.e., complete, single, and partial), the partial price differentiation is the most general one and includes the other two as special cases. By exploiting the unique problem structure, we designed an algorithm that computes the optimal partial pricing scheme in polynomial time and numerically quantized the tradeoff between implementational complexity and total revenue. Under incomplete information, designing an incentive-compatible differentiation pricing scheme is difficult in general. We show that when the users are significantly different, it is possible to design a quantity-based pricing scheme that achieves the same maximum revenue as under complete information.
Due to space limitations, most proofs can be found in our online technical report [25] .
